This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely "selfish" preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are "close". This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences.
Introduction
We have by now ample evidence that preferences of individuals between allocations do not depend only on their own material well being. Rather, the actions and material allocations of other individuals impact directly a person's utility, and are thus taken into account when making a decision. But the research in models of "social preferences," as they are sometimes called, has not delivered empirical implications which change qualitatively our view of economic behavior. We show, however, that these models produce both large and testable effects. We study worker allocation to firms in a contract-theoretic framework, where agents differ in their productivity. We show that even small deviations from purely "selfish" preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation.
Background and related work
We bring together several strands of the economics literature.
Literature on labor market segregation
In the last years, empirical analysis of labor markets identifies an increasing trend toward homogeneous composition of firms in terms of pay and skill. For instance, Acemoglu [1] shows, with US data, that the sorting of workers across occupations increased between 1983 and 1993. 2 Davis and Haltinwanger [17] had already observed that the rise of wage inequality in America is imputable in part to differently abled workers sorting themselves across firms: "The tremendous magnitude of the rise in the size-wage gap indicates that sorting by worker ability across plants of different sizes probably increased over time (pp. 156-157)." In turn, Burgess et al. [13] , with UK data, find that within-group wage inequality can be explained by the dynamic of worker-job allocation in the period [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] .
A different approach to the study of this problem is taken by Kramarz et al. [29] , who compute a measure a specialization for different professional categories proposed by Kremer and Maskin [30] . They find that specialization increased enormously in France between 1986 and 1992: "Blue collar unskilled workers are more and more separated from other types of workers, and therefore, tend to work together in the same firms. This is true for each of the six categories of skills. The number even doubled for clerks." (p. 375). A final kind of evidence for segregation is given by Brown and Medoff [12] , who investigate wage-size differentials (that is, difference in wages across firms of different sizes). They only find evidence for explanations of these differentials based on sorting by the level of skill into firms of different sizes.
The available explanations for this evidence typically rely on complementarities between similarly skilled individuals. Kremer and Maskin [30] and Saint-Paul [38] are good examples of these explanations. 3 Our model, on the other hand, does not impose any form of production complementarities between workers. We propose a form of pecuniary externality. In our model, market outcomes favor more productive workers, and individuals dislike inequalities in their own neighborhood. 4 Although the two kinds of model can explain the recent rise in skill segregation, the explanations are empirically distinguishable. For example, the empirical evidence in Kremer and Maskin [30] deals mainly with ex ante observable skill differences. Our model, however, makes predictions even about ex ante unobservable skill heterogeneity. That is, we can explain increasing wage differentials even after controlling for observables. This is a definite advantage of our explanation, as a large part of the recent increase in wage inequality cannot be attributed to observables. 5 ( ) -
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Literature on social preferences
The implications of our model seem, thus, consistent with the available empirical evidence. What about our assumptions? There is direct evidence for the kind of externality we assume in Bewley [7] . 6 About 78% of the business people whom he interviewed say that internal equity is important for internal harmony and morale. 7 Morale here means "cooperativeness, happiness or tolerance of unpleasantness, and zest for the job." 8 One can find in Section 6.5 of Bewley [7] many revealing quotes from managers about the disruptive effects of lack of equity on the job. 9 He finds as well that internal inequity in firms leads to higher turnover, 10 as our model predicts.
The current wave of work on social preferences in economics was a result of the large experimental evidence that conflicted with the hypothesis of selfishness. For example, in the experimental lab there is more contribution to public goods than purely selfish maximization could be lead us to expect. 11 Perhaps more relevant for this paper, experimental subjects often reject unequal offers in ultimatum bargaining games [25] . 12 A variety of models have been devised to explain these observations. 13 It would be too difficult to discuss all those models in detail, so we refer to the excellent surveys of Sobel [41] and Fehr and Schmidt [21] . A common feature in many of these models is the assumption that individuals dislike payoff inequality. 14 Our innovation with respect to this literature is that we think explicitly about the set of individuals to which the utility comparisons apply. We also provide further testable implications for the model (and implicitly relevant economic applications) and we work with very general social preferences.
Literature on economic implications of social preferences
There are few papers which study the labor market implications of social preferences. The seminal contribution by Frank [23] showed that wages may depart from the value of marginal productivity if workers cared sufficiently strongly about relative payoffs. He assumes people like to be better paid than others, and dislike to be paid worse. Under these conditions, the more productive are paid less than the value of their marginal product as they obtain the "pleasure" of earning more than others. The less productive, on the other hand, are paid more than their marginal productivity to compensate for their "suffering" caused by an inferior wage. 15 Fershtman et al. [22] , in a similar framework, explore the effects of status on effort, and show that firms with 6 Other papers which offer survey evidence on the importance of equity concerns in organizations are: Blinder and Choi [8] , Bewley [6] , Agell and Lundborg [2, 3] , or Campbell and Kamlani [15] . 7 Bewley [7, Table 6 .5]. 8 Bewley [7, p. 42 ].
9 From "Internal equity is very important," to "Inequity causes disharmony" and even "Unfairness can cause upheaval within an organization and lead to dysfunctional activities." 10 Bewley [7, Table 6 .5].
workers of heterogeneous productivities may form, wages may differ across the economy for equally productive workers, and the quest for status may increase total output. Both of these works assume that people actually "like" to be better paid than others. This seems to go against the experimental evidence that motivates the social preferences models with which we work. Cabrales et al. [14] study long-term contracts in a dynamic learning model in the style of Harris and Hölmström [26] where agents have social preferences (of the difference-aversion type) and there are moving costs between firms. The equilibrium of the model displays both between and within-firm wage dispersion. An increase in moving costs reduces the amount of segregation by skill level, thus increasing within-firm wage dispersion. Also, long terms contracts introduce novel internal labor market features such as a dynamic form of wage compression, gradual promotions, and wage nonmonotonicity. The study of these dynamic features comes at the cost (with respect to this paper) of a less general structure for social preferences. For example, the span in social preferences is restricted to workers in the same firm, which makes it easy to abstract from firm location in social space, a major issue in the present work. Also, they assume a simple linear difference aversion form of social preferences, which is also homogeneous across workers. Here, on the other hand, heterogeneity in preferences is allowed, and workers may feel social concerns only when located at some places in the wage distribution. Finally, in this paper we allow for private information.
Fehr et al. [19] , and Rey-Biel [35] use preferences with difference-aversion, which is one type of social preferences compatible with our more general setup. Both papers explore the effects of social preferences on incentive contracts under moral hazard. Fehr et al. [19] show theoretically and experimentally that the presence of even a minority of people with concerns for fairness can alter in an important way the kind of contracts that are efficient. Rey-Biel [35] shows theoretically that the threat of inequity in pay after bad performance can actually induce effort at a lower cost to the principal than without social preferences.
The model
There are N workers, with two types, L and H, which are their private information. The productivity of a worker of type t ∈ {L, H } is t . We assume that H > L . The prior probability of an H type is 1 > p > 0. The material payoff function of a worker i who receives a wage w, and exerts effort e, is
The function c t (e) represents the disutility experienced by a worker of type t when exerting effort e. For a given effort level, e = 0, the cost of effort of an L type is higher than that of an H type, that is, c L (e) > c H (e). We also assume that c t,e (e, ) > 0 and c t,ee (e, ) > 0, for all t ∈ {L, H }. 16 Effort levels are verifiable.
Beyond their own material payoffs, individuals care about the material payoffs of others: Assumption A1 captures the fact that individuals are embedded in a network of social relationships, and that social preferences display a limited span of influence. That is, in addition to the utility they obtain from their own wage and effort, they also experience utility (or disutility) from the material payoffs of close neighbors in their network, and only them. In order to fully specify assumption A1 in our game, we need to discuss what are the N i 's in our context. We do this in the last paragraph of this section when we discuss the spatial structure of our model. Assumption A2 states that every player suffers from some uneven wage profiles in his neighborhood. This formulation is very general, as it includes difference aversion, inequity aversion, and social concerns that depends on the position in the distribution of earnings (i.e. workers who care about inequality only when they are at the low end of the distribution). 17 Besides, this assumption is compatible with heterogeneity in social concerns across individuals, as long as this social concerns, of whichever form, are present for every individual for at least some wage profile.
Assumption A3 states that social concerns are of a secondary order compared with the importance of material payoffs.
The number of firms is endogenously determined in equilibrium. These firms are located in nodes which are distributed in a ring. There is an countably infinite number of such nodes. We allow for more than one firm to occupy the same location. Each firm can employ any number of workers, and technology is constant returns to scale. Net profit for each worker is equal to his productivity , minus the wage w he receives. Firms' profits are determined by the sum of profits per worker. If the firm does not employ any worker, it makes zero profits.
The game proceeds in three stages. First, each firm decides whether to enter, and if so, chooses a location in the ring. Second, each firm offers a menu of contracts to some workers which specifies the wage and effort required of different worker types. Recall that types are private information of the workers, but effort levels are verifiable, thus contractible. Third, each worker i specifies the menus acceptable to him, and the contracts within this menu that he would take. A worker who does not accept any contract obtains a reservation payoff of zero.
An employed worker gets the material payoffs derived by the implemented contract in the firm for which he works. The neighborhood N i of some employed worker i is composed by those workers (if any) employed by firms located in i's employer node, and in the two closest nodes. This neighborhood is the one that enters in the determination of the final social payoffs. Remark 6 below states that our main result is robust to variations of this neighborhood structure, such as involving an arbitrary finite string of adjacent nodes rather than the two closest ones. Notice that since individual firms and workers are free to choose any location, the N i is endogenous, so a worker i needs to form (equilibrium) expectations about the likely size and composition of N i when deciding which, if any, offer to take.
Results
In this section we show that, for the game we just described, in all the subgame perfect equilibria where agents do not use dominated strategies, different types of workers earn a wage equal to their productivity, but they work in different locations. Workers earn their productivity for the usual reasons in a model with competitive wage-setters. The intuition for the spatial segregation result is simple. Since wages equal productivities, and those differ across workers, a low type working in an environment with high types suffers because of his aversion to inequality. A competitor firm, possibly a currently inactive entrant, which is making zero profits in that environment can profitably deviate. He can do so by moving to an empty location and offering a wage slightly below his productivity to the low type that works around high types. Provided this wage is close enough to the productivity, the worker will accept and the firm makes strictly positive profits.
Given the simplicity of the intuitions involved, it may come as a bit of a surprise that we need to resort to undominated subgame perfect equilibrium as a solution concept. The reason becomes more apparent once we look at the following example, which we have stripped down to the essentials to be easier to follow. In particular we have even dispensed with the incomplete information and the cost of effort. Example 1. Let two workers, L and H, whose respective productivities, L and H , are common knowledge. They have no cost of effort. The following actions form part of a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Exactly four firms decide to enter. Firm 1 locates on node 1 and offers worker L a wage equal to L and worker H a wage equal to H , firm 2 locates on node 1 and offers worker L a wage equal to L , firm 3 locates on node 5 and offers worker L a wage
, and worker H a wage equal to H , firm 4 locates on node 5 and offers worker H a wage equal to H . Worker H accepts the offer of firm 1 and worker L accepts the offer of firm 3. 18 The use of dominated strategies by both the firms and the workers is crucial in the construction of the example. In the example, firms make many offers of wages equal to productivity that are not used in the equilibrium path. Those unused offers, which are weakly dominated, are what (out of equilibrium) supports the equilibrium outcome we postulate. Even more importantly, the responses of the players are also (almost) dominated. Take, for example, a deviation by firm 2 to location 3 that offers the L worker a salary w 2 L higher than the one he obtains in equilibrium. If L accepts this offer, he is sure to obtain a utility equal to w 2 L , as he is sure not to experience disutility from inequality. In the proof we assume, instead, that he accepts the standing offer of firm 1. This is because he believes that, after this offer of w 2 L , worker H will decide to accept the standing offer of firm 4, so that the L worker will not experience disutility from inequality by moving to firm 1. But notice that, for w 2 L arbitrarily close to L , he has to be arbitrarily sure that H will indeed move. We find this rather unsatisfactory because of its probable unrealism.
There is one problem that arises if we choose to eliminate dominated strategies. When wages can be chosen from the real numbers, the set of undominated strategies is open. Any wage that is strictly smaller than the productivity of a worker is undominated, but a wage equal to productivity is weakly dominated. So we cannot construct Nash equilibria in undominated strategies, as any wage offer different from the productivity can always be defeated by a nearby proposal. To get rid of this difficulty, we discretize the wage space. We consider a family of discrete wage spaces with increasingly fine grids that approaches the continuum when the grids become infinitely fine.
More precisely, let n 0 , n 1 , n 2 , . . . be an increasing sequence of integers such that n k → +∞.
We assume that t / ∈ k , for all k ∈ N and t ∈ {L, H }. 19 For all k ∈ N, let ε k = 1/n k , and for all t ∈ {L, H }, let 
Corollary 3. When k → +∞, contracts accepted with positive probability pay employees exactly their productivity.
The presence of social preferences does not change the contracts observed in equilibrium, with respect to the equilibrium contracts when agents do not have extended preferences. The proof is very similar as the one for the standard model. One needs to be a bit careful with the deviations that defeat nonequilibrium outcomes. The problem is that those deviations could increase inequality, so either they would not be followed, or they would be too expensive to be profitable. However, we have assumed that a marginal increase in inequality (even considering the whole group) is not more valuable than an increase in material payoff of the same size (assumption A3). The assumption of a countably infinite number of locations allows any firm, incumbent or entrant, to move at an empty location with no firms close by. In combination with the assumption of a finite span of social concerns (assumption A1) and the sensitivity of social payoffs to the local wage profiles (assumption A3) allows to construct deviations that are just like the ones in the standard proofs, adjusted for the potential increase in the inequality. Example 7 at the end of this section shows that without assuming a high enough number of locations, our segregation result would not hold, even if A1, A2 and A3 are satisfied.
The main difference between the equilibria in our model and the ones in the standard model is that firms, here, do not employ workers of different types. Otherwise some firm would have a deviation that would allow it to earn strictly positive profits by attracting workers of just one type with a lower salary. Their decrease in material payoffs is compensated by a decrease in disutility due to a more egalitarian work environment. So in any equilibrium, types are geographically separated. One consequence of this segregation is that, at equilibrium, contracts accepted with positive probability are identical within types, irrespective of employee's location.
Social preferences thus predict both skill and spatial workplace segregation as, at equilibrium, firms hire only from one skill pool and firms employing workers of a given skill level form spatial clusters.
Remark 5.
All previous results hold when individuals are averse to inequality in material utilities (that is, wage minus cost of contracted effort), rather than inequality in wages, that is, when extended social payoffs are of the form 20 :
Remark 6. All previous results hold when the neighborhoods N i are composed by those workers (if any) employed by firms located in i's employer node, and in an arbitrary finite string of adjacent nodes encompassing i's location.
We have assumed that there is a countably infinite number of possible locations. The following example shows that firms may not be spatially segregated by types (separated by empty locations) when this assumption does not hold.
Example 7.
There are exactly four different nodes on the ring, two workers of type L and two workers of type H. Individual productivities are common knowledge and workers have no cost of effort. Extended preferences are of the form
Then, there exists a nonsegregated equilibrium where exactly four firms enter, one at each node, with one H type worker at nodes 1 and 2, and one L type worker at nodes 3 and 4. Each worker is employed by one firm and wages are equal to productivities.
Conclusion
This paper shows that small deviations from "selfish" preferences leads to sorting of workers into firms by abilities. This coincides with empirically observed sorting patterns. A natural question is whether our explanation is more important than others for explaining the observation. One competing hypothesis, which would lead to similar results in our context, is that workers of the same type have complementary sets of skills. The two hypothesis are observationally distinguishable for several reasons. First, as mentioned in the discussion of the literature, our model makes predictions about segregation also when the type differences are not ex ante observable.
Second, in our model, the pecuniary externality is driven by the fact that firms compete between themselves. In the absence of that externality there would be no reason for separation. So if a firm had market power in the labor market, and the outside option of workers was not related to their type (say, the skills were highly job-specific), all workers would be paid the same. Thus, our model would not predict sorting, whereas the model with complementarities would still predict them. While it is not easy to think of markets that precisely fit those conditions, there are many markets for qualified workers in Europe, like those of physicians and teachers, where the public sector has strong market power. If the amount of sorting in those markets were somewhat smaller than in others for workers of similar characteristics, our hypothesis would clearly have explanatory power. More empirical field work seems like a good avenue for further research.
Third, the pecuniary externality rooted in social preferences has a wide span of testable implications for labor market dynamics, as we analyze fully in Cabrales et al. [14] .
On the other hand, experimental work appears to be more challenging for this topic than for others that have to do with social preferences. It will be difficult to control in the lab the network structure of preferences. By choosing subjects from physically distant places, and running the experiment on the Internet, one could emulate the social structure of the model. In any case, we believe that a contribution of this paper is that it confronts the field with the important issue of who is included in the interpersonal comparisons and how much. A better understanding of this issue could also contribute to clarify the other important (at least from an evolutionary point of view) question of why agents care about payoff differences.
One other observation on empirical testing arises from the fact that individuals may not be averse to inequality when the output measure of others is very objective. It may be debatable who is the best economist in a certain department (the current fashion for ranking individuals notwithstanding), but is less controversial who is the top scorer in a soccer team. If indeed aversion to inequality depends on the objectivity of the output measure, then one would expect less sorting by skill-type (thus more within-firm inequality) in soccer teams that in universities.
Let k ∈ N and G k be the corresponding game. We denote by m k
f,i,H the menu of contracts offered by firm f to player i. For all i ∈ N , let M k i = {m k f,i } f ∈F denote the set of contracts offered to player i by all firms. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G k 's second stage (acceptance) game is a profile of accepted menus × i∈N M k i .
Proof of Proposition 2.
We decompose it into the following lemmata.
Lemma 8. For all k ∈ N, at every SPNE of G k , firms ex ante profits are nonnegative and strictly smaller than ε k .
Proof. Suppose not. Let k ∈ N and G k be the corresponding game. Then there exists some SPNE of G k where some firms ex ante profits are higher or equal than ε k . Consider such an SPNE, denoted by * SPNE. Let m k * be the menu that makes the highest expected profit at * SPNE. This menu is offered by some firm f to some player i, that is, Proof. Let k ∈ N and G k be the corresponding game. We first show that for any firm f and independently of its location, the wage w k f,i,L proposed by f to some player i, and accepted by i whenever
Suppose on the contrary that some firm f offers at some location a wage w k f,i,L < k L which is part of a contract accepted with positive probability. Consider some firm g making zero profits, possibly a new entrant. Suppose that g deviates to an empty location and offers the contract k L , e k f,i,L to some of f 's current workers. Then, g makes ex post profits which are higher or equal than ε k with any worker eager to accept such wage offer, whatever his type. Therefore, g makes ex ante profits which are higher or equal than ε k , which is impossible by Lemma 8. We now show that the wage w k f,i,H proposed by any firm f to some player i, and accepted by i whenever t i = H , is such that w k f,i,H k H . Suppose not. Then, there exists some firm f offering a contract w k f,i,H , e k f,i,H accepted with positive probability by some H type workers, where w k f,i,H < k H . Lemma 9 implies that, for k high enough, no L type worker accepts this contract. In other words, for k high enough, the extended social payoffs of any L type worker accepting w k f,i,H , e k f,i,H are strictly lower than the extended utility obtained with some alternative contract. Switching contracts modifies both the material payoffs and the inequality payoffs accruing to some individual. Given A3, variations in inequality induced by unilateral switching of contracts do never offset the corresponding variations in material payoffs, and unilateral decisions to pick up a contract out of an array of alternatives are governed solely by material payoff concerns. Therefore, for k high enough, no L type worker accepts w k f,i,H , e k f,i,H because the corresponding material payoffs are strictly lower than those obtained with some alternative offered contract. Consider some firm g making zero profits. Suppose that g deviates to an empty location and offers the contract k H , e k f,i,H to some of f 's current workers. By A2 it is a weakly dominant strategy for all H type workers in f 's workforce to accept g's offer given that it increases their material payoffs, and there is no disutility due to inequality at g's new location. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let k ∈ N and G k be the corresponding game. Consider SPNE of G k , denoted by * SPNE. Given a location , denote by n the number of workers employed at and at its two adjacent nodes at * SPNE. We have n = n ,L + n ,H , where n ,t denotes the number of t type workers employed at and at its two adjacent nodes, t ∈ {L, H }. For all t ∈ {L, H }, let q ,t = n ,t n if n = 0, Therefore, at , employed workers face a strictly positive disutility due to inequality. Any L type worker employed at would be strictly better off at with the same contract because he would face a smaller disutility due to inequality. Therefore, any firm making zero profits at the current equilibrium moving to and offering a contract k L − ε k , where k is high enough, could attract such L type workers (and possibly some H type workers too) and make ex ante profits strictly higher than ε k , thus violating Lemma 4.
Proof of Example 1. To show that this is indeed part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, we need to specify the responses of the workers to deviations by the firms. In fact we do not need to specify responses to all possible deviations, but only to unilateral deviations of one firm. Worker H is already obtaining a salary equal to productivity, so no deviation that intends to attract H can ever be profitable. Thus, the only possibly profitable deviations are those that affect worker L. Clearly, firm 3 is already making the maximum possible profit in this environment, so only deviations by firms 1, 2, and 4 need to be considered: 
Proof of Example 7.
It is readily checked that this game has two subgame perfect Nash equilibria (modulo a relabeling of nodes). In both cases, workers are paid exactly their productivity at equilibrium: (a) a segregated equilibrium, where both H type workers are located at node 1, and both L type workers are located at node 2, and individual extended payoffs at equilibrium are U i = t i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. (b) a nonsegregated equilibrium, where H type workers are located at nodes 1 and 2, and L type workers at nodes 3 and 4, and extended payoffs are U i = t i − ( H − L )/2, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
